capturePlayer(e.target);
今晚，章泽天的个人播客“小天章”发布第二期预告，对话中国速登珠峰第一人曾燕红。因为停更已经45天，不少网友直呼“终于等到更新”。
，更多细节参见91视频
Each layer catches different attack classes. A namespace escape inside gVisor reaches the Sentry, not the host kernel. A seccomp bypass hits the Sentry’s syscall implementation, which is itself sandboxed. Privilege escalation is blocked by dropping privileges. Persistent state leakage between jobs is prevented by ephemeral tmpfs with atomic unmount cleanup.
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The critical thing to understand is namespaces are visibility walls, not security boundaries. They prevent a process from seeing things outside its namespace. They do not prevent a process from exploiting the kernel that implements the namespace. The process still makes syscalls to the same host kernel. If there is a bug in the kernel’s handling of any syscall, the namespace boundary does not help.