Seccomp-BPF inside the namespace — blocking syscalls like clone3 (preventing nested namespace escape), io_uring (force fallback to epoll), ptrace, kernel module loading
If you enable --privileged just to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nested process isolation, you have added one layer (nested process visibility) while removing several others (seccomp, all capability restrictions, device isolation). The net effect is arguably weaker isolation than a standard unprivileged container. This is a real trade-off that shows up in production. The ideal solutions are either to grant only the specific capability needed instead of all of them, or to use a different isolation approach entirely that does not require host-level privileges.。业内人士推荐safew官方版本下载作为进阶阅读
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